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THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT
AND THE RULE OF LAW*

Frank E. Cooperf
a long time, people have been talking about the executive
department of government and the Rule of Law. Indeed, the
suggestion of Aristotle that government should be by law, and not
by men, represented a protest directed to the earlier Grecian systems of despotically controlled administrative law.1 It is my
privilege this afternoon to carry fonvard the discussion of a problem that has been talked about for some two thousand years: how
to apply the Rule of Law to the executive agencies of the government. They are commonly called "independent agencies" within
the executive branch. I suggest that the name is well chosen, for
they have assumed a degree of independence that puts them beyond the effective control of the legislatures and the courts. This,
I make bold to suggest, should not be so, if we are to preserve the
Rule of Law to which as lawyers we have all dedicated our lives;
for the very concept of the Rule of Law "means in the last resort
the right of the judges to control the executive government...."
These are the words of the venerable A. V. Dicey, barrister-at-law
of the Inner Temple and Vinerian Professor at Oxford. He wrote
them seventy-four years ago.2
Now, it has become commonplace to treat Mr. Dicey with a
sort of polite condescension. But as I re-read his famous book a
few weeks ago, I was impressed with the thought that his ideas are
not so different from those expressed only a few months ago by a
hard-headed and practical American lawyer, Mr. Louis J. Hector,
in his famous Memorandum to the President, written upon the
occasion of his resigning from the Civil Aeronautics Board.
This recent reiteration of Mr. Dicey's ideas suggests that it is
relevant to re-examine what Mr. Dicey had to say; and then consider whether his suggestions are pertinent to our contemporary
post-war thinking about the rule of law. He declared: "In Eng-
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• Lecture delivered on June 23, 1960, as part of a series of lectures on the general topic,
"Post-'War Thinking About the Rule of Law," given in connection with the Special
Summer School for Lawyers held at The University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor.
June 20-July I, 1960.-Ed.
t Of the Detroit Bar; Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed.
1 The classic phrase found in Part I, § 30, of the Massachusetts Constitution, 1780, was
borrowed from Harrington [OCEANA 2-29 (1656)] who acknowledged his indebtedness to
Aristotle's PoLmcs III, xvi, 4-5.
2 DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CoNsrrrunON 401 (2d ed. 1886).
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land, and in ... the United States ... the system of administrative
law and the very principles on which it rests are in truth unknown."3 This is so, he added, because the system of administrative law4 "rests upon political principles at variance with the ideas
which are embodied in our existing constitution, and contradicts
modern English convictions as to the rightful supremacy or rule
of the law of the land.''5
Some years later, reviewing in the Law Quarterly Review the
now famous decision in Local Government Board v. Arlidge, [1915]
A.C. 120, which permitted a municipal council to order a rooming
house closed after an ex parte investigation and without notice or
hearing, Mr. Dicey pointed out that this decision allowed executive
agencies of government to exercise judicial authority not in accordance with the procedures of the courts of law, but rather in
accordance with whatever procedures the agency found to be
"convenient in the transaction of the business." 6
There can be no doubt but that Mr. Dicey was most accurate
in his prediction that administrative agencies would, as they developed, operate not in accordance with traditional judicial modes,
but rather in accordance with such procedures as they might find
convenient. This thought was echoed and strongly emphasized
a few years ago by the United States Supreme Court.7
But was Mr. Dicey correct in his contention that this course of
development would be in derogation of the Rule of Law? Was he
a prophet without honor, or an old-fashioned viewer-with-alarm?
For a long time I thought his views were outdated. But on recently re-reading them, I was impressed with the close similarity
between his views and those expressed last September by Mr.
Hector in his Memorandum to the President. He said (p. 29)
that the failure of the members of regulatory commissions to decide
cases on the basis of personal knowledge of the record, and their
failure to explain the reasons for their decisions, mean "that the
3Id. at 182.
Ibid. He was speaking particularly of the droit administratif of France; but his
remarks can fairly be applied in a broader context.
5Id. at 205.
6 31 L.Q. REv. 149, 151 (1915).
7 In FTC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 142 (1940), Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed for the Court: "Modern administrative tribunals ••. have been a response
to the felt need of governmental supervision over economic enterprise.••. Perhaps the
most striking characteristic of this movement has been the investiture of administrative
agencies with power far exceeding and different from the conventional judicial modes for
adjusting conflicting claims ...• These differences in origin and function preclude wholesale transplantation of the rules of procedure, trial, and review which have evolved from
the history and experience of courts."
4
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so-called 'quasi-judicial' processes of the agencies bear little relation to what is normally thought of as judicial process."
More specifically, he asserted (p. 19) that the public "have the
right to expect, as a part of the basic judicial process:
"I. That adjudicated cases will be decided on the basis
of general principles and standards known to the parties and
applicable to all cases, and
"2. That the persons who decide adjudicated cases will do
so on the basis of the voluminous testimony and arguments
advanced by the parties and this alone, and that they will personally state the reasons for their decision."

But, Mr. Hector added, "Neither of these reasonable expectations is satisfied by present Board procedures and practices."
We find, in short, that the English scholar ,vriting in 1886 and
the hard-headed American lawyer ,vriting in 1959 reached the
same conclusion, which might fairly be summarized with the blunt
assertion that the conduct of administrative agencies is in derogation of the judicial process which we describe as the rule of law.
So blunt is this assertion that I should like to buttress it by a
number of examples illustrating the wide disparity between the
administrative and the judicial process-disparities which indicate
a well-defined tendency on the part of the agencies to depart from
the norms that characterize our Anglo-American Rule of Law. Then
I should like to suggest what I deem to be the principal reasons
for this departure. Finally, I should like to review briefly the
principal proposals now being urged in the hope of healing this
rapidly developing breach between the executive agencies of the
government and the Rule of Law-proposals to integrate the functions of the administrative agencies with the judicial process.

Examples of the Disparity
Illustrations of the fundamental disparities between the administrative and the judicial process fall into two principal categories: (a) differences in the attitude of the decision-maker; (b)
differences in the process of reaching the decision.

Judge v. Administrator-Eight Differences in Attitude
I. Perhaps the outstanding illustration of the deep-seated
differences in attitude between administrators and judges concerns
their interest or disinterest in the result. In the Anglo-American
legal system, judges are steeped in long-established traditions of
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impartiality. A judge will frequently disqualify himself for the
slightest reason that might conceivably affect the impartiality of his
judgment. On the other hand, administrators, appointed to administer broad policies of social or economic reform, entertain so
strong a predilection for rapid implementation of these policies,
that they exhibit an active interest in the outcome of cases pending
before them. Such interest, to be sure, is inherent in the purpose
for which such agencies are created; and the absence of such interest would interfere with their most effective functioning. But
over-concern with the desirability of achieving appointed ends
sometimes leads to an excess of zeal-as illustrated by the antipathy
toward participation by counsel in agency proceedings, sometimes encountered, or a pronounced antagonism toward judicial
review.
2. A second outstanding characteristic of the administrative
process is the broad scope of administrative discretion. Although
courts characteristically eschew discretionary standards in determining legal rights, discretion is the very life-blood of administrative adjudication. It can be granted that the vesting of discretionary powers in administrative agencies is necessary to the most
effective performance of their appointed tasks. But at the same
time, it clearly appears that where agencies predicate their decisions on such vague standards as what is deemed "adequate,"
"desirable," "detrimental" and the like, what might be called the
rule of discretion is substituted for the Rule of Law. Discretion
can be exercised more freely when cases are decided without a
hearing; and the resulting tendency to minimize the importance of
hearings has had far-reaching effects on the course of administrative decision. Again, reliance on the role of discretion has disinclined many agencies to make available for the use of interested
parties any clear statements either of the exact practice and procedure of the agency, or the criteria relied on by the agency in
deciding cases.
3. A third characteristic attitude of administrative agencies
is to emphasize (if not magnify) their stature by seeking to extend
their jurisdiction to the furthest possible limits. Not infrequently,
they press further than the legislature intended. The courts have
had occasion to strike down unwarranted assumptions of jurisdiction by such agencies as the Federal Trade Commission,8 the
BFTC v. Bunte Bros., Inc., 312 U.S. 349 (1941).
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Interstate Commerce Commission,9 the Securities and Exchange
Commission,10 the Federal Power Commission,11 and others. Sometimes it has been Congress rather than the courts which called a
halt, as when the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of
Labor determined that its jurisdiction over employees engaged
in occupations necessary to the production of goods for commerce
extended to the gardener who mowed the grass and trimmed the
geraniums in a garden outside the executive offices of a company
in whose plant goods were produced.12
4. A fourth illustration of the expansive genius of administration may be seen in the cases where the courts have struck down
administrative decisions on the ground that the administrators
have adopted policies going beyond or even at variance with the
standards of the statutes which the agencies administer. Thus,
the Court has criticized the Federal Communications Commission
for seeking to accomplish through agency regulations an amendment in the governing statute which it had unsuccessfully requested of Congress.13 The National Labor Relations Board has
been reminded by the Supreme Court that a company "cannot be
held guilty of an unfair labor practice by administrative amendment of the statute.''14 Similarly, the Interstate Commerce Commission has been reversed because it added a requirement not included in or authorized by the statute, as a condition of acquiring
a carrier Iicense.15 The Civil Aeronautics Board was criticized by
the Court on the ground that it "forsook the standard" imposed
by Congress "and adopted a different one."16 The Federal Trade
Commission was found to have adopted policies at variance with
those of the statute, when it asserted power to compel a seller of
patent medicines to include in his advertisements statements that
would be derogatory of the value of his product.17 The Supreme
Court has more than once had occasion to condemn administrative
determinations of the Internal Revenue Service as being invalid
United States v. Pacific Coast ·wholesalers' Ass'n, 338 U.S. 689 (1950).
v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936).
11 FPC v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 337 U.S. 498 (1949).
12 Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1949, 63 Stat. 911, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1958).
13 FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284 (1954).
14 Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. NLRB, !138 U.S. 355, 364 (1949).
15 Barrett Line v. United States, 326 U.S. 179 (1945).
16 Civil Aeronautics Board v. Summerfield, 347 U.S. 67, 72 (1954).
17 Alberty v. FTC, 182 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1950).

9
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attempts to "add a supplementary legislative provision" to a
statute.18
5. A fifth characteristic attitude of agencies has to do with
their evaluation of the evidence presented in contested cases.
Their constant striving to reach desired results tends to make most
administrators "convicting judges." The performance of most
agencies in the appraisal of evidence leaves much to be desired,
from the viewpoint of achieving a scrupulously impartial determination of facts. The reports contain a distressingly large number of cases wherein courts have felt compelled-despite the crutch
afforded by the substantial evidence rule-to set aside agency findings of facts as being based on mere conjecture and speculation.19
6. The principle of stare decisis is little heeded in administrative adjudication. Indeed, to the extent that the doctrine is
founded on the notion that the law does not change-or that it
changes slowly-the classical doctrine of stare decisis does not
square with the theory and practice of the agencies. It is commonplace that today's ruling may be based on a different policy, or on
a different principle or philosophy, than yesterday's ruling. This
attitude of treating each decision as a unique phenomenon, unaffected by precedent, sharply differentiates the administrative
process from the judicial.
7. The principle of res judicata is likewise inapplicable to
administrative adjudication-and properly so, for agencies are not
courts, and their determinations are not judgments. But it should
be noted in passing that the freedom of agencies to disregard the
philosophy on which the res judicata principle is based, leads to
attitudes which are at odds with the traditional approach of the
Rule of Law.
8. The last of the eight attitudes I should like to mention is
that which makes many agencies impatient to hear out the respondent. It is only natural that an agency which acts as both
prosecutor and judge, and which does not institute proceedings
until its own informal investigation has convinced it preliminarily
of respondent's guilt, should display a certain readiness to treat
respondent's offers of proof in somewhat cavalier fashion. Seldom
does this treatment go so far as the instance reported in Brinkley
18 E.g., Helvering v. Credit Alliance Corp., 316 U.S. 107, 113 (1942): Helvering v.
American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322 (1943).
19 For cases, see Cooper, The "Substantial Evidence" Rule, 44 A.B.A.J. 945 (1958).

1961]

THE EXECUTIVE AND THE RULE OF LAW

521

v. Hassig. 20 There, in proceedings to revoke a physician's license,
one of the members of the licensing board, after listening to respondent's testimony for three days, said he was ready to voteagainst respondent-and asked permission to cast his vote and be
excused for more pressing business. Most administrators are more
sophisticated, but the attitude so forthrightly indicated by the very
frank physician in the Kansas case twenty-five years ago has persisted, and had been criticized by such diverse authorities as President Roosevelt and the Hoover Commission. It is an attitude
which, along with the others, reveals a tendency at odds with
the fundamental concepts of the Rule of Law.
Courts v. Agencies -Differences in Procedure
Differences in the process of decision-no less than differences
in mental attitude-account for the tendency of administrators to
depart from the norms that characterize the Rule of Law. We all
know, as the Court recently reminded us in Speiser v. Randall,21
that "the procedures by which the facts of the case are determined
assume an importance fully as great as the validity of the substantive rule of law to be applied."
We all know, too, the typical process of agency adjudication:
The materia of decision [pleadings, a transcript of testimony,
exhibits (frequently, thousands of pages of exhibits), a hearing
examiner's report, proposed findings by each party (duly excepted
to by the other party) and voluminous briefs] are all dumped into
the files of the agency, like ingredients dumped into a metaphysical
crucible or melting pot; and there a secret group of anonymous
staff assistants blend them into a witches brew from which finally
emerges a secret staff memo (in formulistic adherence to the requirements of the Morgan case) that becomes transmuted into an
agency decision.
Long ago, the Supreme Court declared in Morgan v. United
States22 that the agency members who decide the case must master
the record. But this is an impossible command. There is recorded
the instance of the member of the Interstate Commerce Commission who found that over a period of two years he cast a case-deciding vote every twelve and one-half minutes of his working time. 23
20 83 F.2d 351 (10th Cir. 1936).
21 357 U.S. 513, 520 (1958).
22 298 U.S. 468 (1936).
23 DAVIS, CAsES ON ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW 423 (1951).
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Commissioner Hector pointed out (p. 34) that members of the
C.A.B. find "there is no real chance for a review of the record"
and that "the thousands of man-hours which go into the making of
a record are thus virtually ignored at the crucial moment of final
decision."
It is not the members of the agency who make the decision.
The actual decision is hammered out by the unseen, unknown,
unapproachable (we hope!) staff assistants-a group of lawyers,
engineers, statisticians, technicians, and political hacks. They
produce a staff "memo" which too frequently affords substantially
the only source of information available to the agency members,
when they decide the case. Deciding the case is sometimes made
easier, to be sure, because the staff memo is frequently accompanied
by a proposal for decision-a proposal which, judged by the supporting memorandum-appears eminently reasonable.
How well these staff memoranda are prepared no one can judge
-for they are secret documents not made available to the parties
to the case. The actual decision-making process within the
agencies is one, as Donald C. Beelar so well put it, "about which
we know almost as little as we know about the dark side of the
moon." 24 We do know that a great deal of internal maneuvering
goes on. We do know that the maneuvering includes external
influence and pressures, as individuals possessing an interest in
the matter and some degree of influence approach the agency staff,
much as lobbyists approach legislators. We do know that as of a
few years ago in the National Labor Relations Board, for example,25 a detailed review of the record in representation cases
was made by only one person-one of the junior legal assistants to
one of the members of the Board. We do know that the trial
examiner's report and recommendation is frequently disregarded.
We do know, to borrow again from Mr. Beelar, that all these
internal maneuverings may have more to do with the actual decision than anything in the hearing record.
Can you imagine any procedure further removed from norms
consonant with the Rule of Law? It is as if a trial judge, at the
conclusion of a hearing, bundled up the record and briefs of the
parties and turned them over to the law clerks of the judges sitting
on the appellate court, and these law clerks prepared short memos
24 Beelar, The Dark Phase of Agency Litigation, 12 Ad. L. Bull. 34 (1959).
25 The Problem of Delay in Administering the Labor-Management Relations Act, Staff
Report to the Subcommittee on Labor and Labor-Management Relations of the Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare, U.S. Senate, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. ll-15 (1952).
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-perhaps five or ten pages to a case-and the judges of the appellate
court were asked to render initial decision on the basis of such
memos (which the parties were not even permitted to see) at a
rate approximating five decisions per houri
Even this comparison is not complete, for it leaves out the
element which is really critical in the administrative process of
adjudication-the tugging and tussling within the agency staff,
where in the war of competing philosophies and ideologies andfrankly-political pressures, the testimony of the parties and the
points argued in briefs of counsel and the recommendations of the
trial examiner may be quite overlooked; where a litigant may be
ambushed by secret lurking forces without his knowing what has
happened.
When the decision does finally emerge from all this maelstrom,
it bears little resemblance to a court opinion. The latter is essentially a carefully reasoned statement of the principles which led
to the decision, serving not only to explain the basis of the decision
but to afford a guide upon which future conduct may be patterned
so as to conform to the Rule of Law, and to afford a precedent upon
which future cases may be decided. But the opinion-writing staffs
of agencies, as Mr. Hector has told us, explain that they consciously
avoid statements of general principle as much as possible in the
opinions they write, because they must be able to write an opinion
justifying an opposite conclusion the next day, and hence must not
be hampered by prior statements of general principles (p. 26).
In short, the typical processes of administrative adjudication
are fundamentally at odds with the tenets of the Rule of Law. It
was Mr. Hector's conclusion (p. 30) that the administrative system
does not produce consistent, informed, responsible, or articulate
judgments-and that it is an ideal breeding ground for ex parte
presentations and improper influence (p. 30).

A Pathological Specimen
I have undertaken to describe the attitudes which differentiate
agencies from the courts, and the characteristics of administrative
adjudication that create its unique problems. Now I should like
to direct your attention to a pathological specimen that shows what
can happen-indeed, what did happen-as a result of the attitudes
and procedures I have undertaken to describe in general terms.
Anna Myers was a widow, thirty-five years of age, with two
children; and she was lonely. By some happy chance, she met
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Charles Boyd, a widower, fifty-nine years old, who had six of his
nine children living with him. They fell in love and were married.
The bride took her two children with her to her husband's abode,
but unfortunately the house was too small for the two families.
The husband's children resented their father's new bride; and
there was some trouble between the two sets of children. In the
course of time, relations became so strained that the bride and
groom decided the only way to attain peaceful and harmonious
relationships was to maintain two houses. His children lived in
one; hers in the other. Thus was connubial bliss restored; and
during their two years and eight months of marriage, they were
blessed with three children-twins born in April 1954, and a third
child born posthumously in May 1955. The record established
continuous cohabitation as man and wife. Indeed, his death-the
event which gave rise to the case-occurred when he suffered a
heart attack one night while in his wife's intimate embrace.
The husband had been, in the parlance of the Social Security
Administration, a fully-insured individual; and accordingly after
his death Anna applied for the various benefits due under the law
to a widow who had been living with a fully-insured husband at
the time of his death. Her claim was denied on the grounds that
she was not living with her husband at the time of his death. This
somewhat startling conclusion was predicated on the theory that
if husband and wife have separate abodes, they cannot be deemed
to be living together. Evidence as to the reason for dividing the
family between two houses-and indeed, evidence as to the circumstances of his death-was all irrelevant; such matters could
not change established administrative policy. The policy, to be
sure, had its genesis elsewhere than in the statute. The statute20
provided in part that a widow shall be deemed to have been living
with her husband if they were both members of the same household [it said nothing about sharing the same abode] or if he had
been contributing to her support, or if he had been ordered to do
so. To the reviewing courts, it appeared plain that Anna must be
deemed to have been living with her husband, under the plain
language of the statute as applied to the undisputed facts. But it
was apparently the fixed policy of the agency that if husband and
wife shared two residences, they could not be deemed to be members of the same household. In short, the statutory test was
whether husband and wife were living together; but the administrative test was whether they had only one house. Thus, it may
26

64 Stat. c. 809, § 216 (h) (2) (1950).

1961]

THE EXECUTIVE AND THE RULE OF LAW

525

be seen how the sweet freedom of administrative discretion can
lead an agency to establish policies at odds with the legislative
intent.
Following the administrative denial of her claim, Anna requested the hearing afforded her by statute. This was duly held,
and the referee upheld the administrative denial of Anna's claim.
With great tact, he made no reference to the most explicit testimony adduced as to the occasion of the husband's demise, except
to observe, "He died while visiting the claimant."
Anna then applied for a review by the Appeals Council, the
appellate body of the Bureau. The Council, however, refused to
review the case-on the somewhat discomforting ground that "a
review of the referee's decision would result in no advantage to
the claimant." Here is a pointed illustration of the prejudgment
that occurs when an agency sits as judge in its o,;vn cause.
It might also be noted that the agency had a more direct interest
in the case. It had already made certain payments to a child of
decedent's previous marriage; and these payments would have to
be characterized as an unauthorized disbursement if the widow's
claim were upheld. She was, in effect, asking the agency to say it
had decided wrong the first time.
Fortunately, Anna had a lawyer-and a courageous one. Most
claimants do not have the advantage of legal representation, for
the agency's regulations27 prohibit an attorney from charging or
receiving a fee in excess of ten dollars, except as otherwise specifically authorized. It is easy to understand why most la,;vyers do
not eagerly accept for such a fee a case which involves study of a
complex insurance statute of more than 100 pages, implemented
by some 277 pages of regulations in fine print, and which may
involve (as in Anna's case) filing the initial papers, appearing at a
hearing which occupied the better part of a day, and then seeking
an administrative appeal, and prosecuting it if it is allowed. Even
if counsel is willing to do all this for ten dollars, he may understandably feel discouraged because of the circumstance that there
are those who suspect that many policies of the Social Security Administration are set forth in unpublished documents which the
hearing examiners follow but which are unavailable to the parties
or their counsel.
But Anna's counsel exhausted all administrative remedies and
pursued his case by petition for review to the federal district court.
That tribunal denied a government motion for summary judgment
27 20 C.F.R. § 403.713 (d) (2) (1949).
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(:filed apparently for the reason that the agency did not want Anna
to have a hearing, even in court, on the question whether she was
living with her husband when in his intimate embrace on the
night of his death) and entered an order reversing the decision of
the Social Security Administration.28
The Government appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, charging in its brief that the decision of the district
court "has over-ruled the long-established administrative understanding." (Brief, p. 14) But the appeal was unsuccessful, the
court preferring to decide the case on the basis of the statutory
language, rather than the administrative understanding.20
While this sorry tale concerns an admittedly extreme case-one
which can most kindly be described as pathological-yet it may
serve to illustrate the problem that is raised by the conflict between
administrative adjudication and the rule of law; and it may serve
as a point of departure for discussing a few basic questions seeking
to probe the reasons for this unfortunate conflict.

The Reasons for the Trend Toward Administrative Adjudication
Among the reasons advanced retrospectively to explain the
phenomenal trend during the last three decades away from the
Rule of Law and toward administrative adjudication, one of the
most popular rationalizations is that the courts were not equal to
the task-that there were too many cases for the courts to decide,
and that the cases presented problems too difficult and technical
for the judicial mind.
But actually, I submit, this is not true at all. The courts could
handle the cases being decided by administrative agencies. We
might need more courts, of course, and more judges. But there
never seems to be any great difficulty in :finding able lawyers willing
to accept lifetime appointments as federal judges. Nor have the
judges been incompetent to master the difficult problems involved.
The Tax Court and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals pass
on questions just as complex and technical as the questions passed
on by the I.C.C. and S.E.C. In reality, the trend toward administrative adjudication reflects not a breakdown of the courts, but
rather a breakdown of the legislative process.
Most agencies have been created because Congress faced a
situation where it was clear that some law was needed to prevent
or correct potential social abuses, but where it was not at all clear
28Boyd v. Folsom, 149 F. Supp. 925 (W.D. Pa. 1957).
20 Boyd v. Folsom, 257 F.2d 778 (3d Cir. 1958).
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what the law should be. Not having sufficient information about
the problem to lay down a well formulated policy, Congress took
the easy way out of the dilemma by creating an agency, and delegating to the agency responsibility for settling fundamental matters
of policy, and implementing such policy by rules having the force
of law. Such was the general situation which led to the creation
of such agencies as the Interstate Commerce Commission, Federal
Trade Commission, Securities Exchange Commission, Atomic
Energy Commission, and many others that might be mentioned.
Congress, of course, gave polite recognition to the legal principle
that some standard must be created to limit the agency's policymaking responsibilities, but the standards set up were so vague as
to amount to little more than the expression of a pious hope that
the agency would act in the public interest.
It may, indeed, be necessary, upon venturing into a new field
of governmental regulation, to grant the agency wide powers.
Perhaps the agency must, initially, have some authority to experiment. But as experience defines the contours of the problem involved, opportunities are afforded to redefine and tighten the
standards which guide administrative action, terminating the
agency's authority to perpetuate unsuccessful experiments. Occasionally the Congress has done this, as in the 1947 amendments
to the National Labor Relations Act. But too often the Congress
has permitted the original enactment to stand for generations without significant amendment. The whole body of radio law, for
example (or so I am told), is based upon a statute adopted in 1927,
when the knowledge of the problems involved was very slight.
Those of us who turned to the Communications Act last winter to
see what guide it provided to solve the many problems by which
the radio and television industry has recently been so bitterly
plagued found that it provided no guide at all to most of the problems-because those problems had not been envisaged in 1927.
If Congress had kept the act up to date through the years, the
situation would have been much healthier.
But the fact seems to be that Congress has lost much of its
ability to legislate. Its capacity to produce legislation is no greater
now than it was forty or fifty years ago. When we pause to think
of all the streamlining which has been done in the courts during
the past fifty years, does it not seem strange that Congress has done
so little to modernize its mm procedures?
It would seem that Congress is in dire need of a more efficient
staff organization-a staff which could hear all affected groups, and
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study the problems involved, and then submit to the appropriate
congressional committee a carefully planned proposal for legislative solution of the problems that are now turned over-lock, stock,
and barrel-to an administrative agency. Surely, if Congress can
delegate such broad powers to an independent agency, it can
delegate a comparable measure of power to its own staff organizations-and if the delegation were thus kept with Congress' own
organization, there would be closer supervision and avoidance of
some of the dangers that result from delegating the legislative function to an independent agency.
When responsibility for formulating policy, through the twin
measures of rulemaking and ad hoc administrative adjudication,
is delegated to an organization so large that responsibility is divided
among hundreds of persons, many of whom are politically motivated, it is inevitable that there should result a tendency toward
government by men, and not by law.
This was well pointed out by that patron saint of all Republican critics of administrative agencies, the late Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, who said in 1937:
"There is a conflict of principle involved in their make-up
and functions .... They are vested with duties of administration ... and at the same time they are given important judicial
work.... The evils resulting from this confusion of principles
are insidious and far-reaching. . . . Pressures and influences
properly enough directed toward officers responsible for
formulating and administering policy constitute an unwholesome atmosphere in which to adjudicate private rights. But
the mixed duties of the commissions render escape from these
subversive influences impossible. Furthermore, the same men
are obliged to serve both as prosecutors and as judges. This
not only undermines judicial fairness; it weakens public confidence in that fairness. Commission decisions affecting private rights and conduct lie under the suspicion of being
rationalizations of the preliminary findings which the Commission, in the role of prosecutor, presented to itself." 30

The Remedy
I observed that people have been talking about administrative
law since at least the time of Aristotle. It might be added that
from time to time, through the years, they have done things about
it.
ao Quoted, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 206 (1941).
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The Magna Carta was the result of the very effective protests
by the barons gathered at Runnymede, who objected to the administrative law of King John. The American Declaration of
Independence charged many abuses against the administrative
agencies comprising the British Government's colonial establishment. Incidentally, many of the phrases employed in that document by Thomas Jefferson have a surprisingly modern ring. It
protested the "multitude of new offices" that had been created.
It objected to the "swarms of officers" sent to "harass" the people.
It bemoaned the fact that administrative officers were displacing
the legislatures, and depriving the citizens of the benefits of fair
trials in the courts.
Perhaps our brief review this afternoon of the attitudes and
procedures of administrative agencies suggests that the time has
come once again for the people of this country to do something
about applying the Rule of Law to the executive agencies of the
Government.
We must of course move with caution and circumspection. As
Mr. Justice Stone warned in United Statesv. Morgan,31 we must not
"repeat in this day the mistake made by the courts of law when
equity was struggling for recognition as an ameliorating system of
justice."
What was the mistake to which Mr. Justice Stone referred? Was
it not the mistake of attempting to continue an artificial separation
of law and equity-a separation which is continuing to cause
trouble even to this very day? If we are to avoid this mistake, must
we not move along the path of integrating the functions of the
agencies with those of Congress and of the courts?
This, in brief, is the fundamental tenet of the recommendations of the second Hoover Commission, many of whose proposals
(somewhat modified in form as a result of the work of the drafting
committees of the American Bar Association) are now pending in
Congress. They adopt four basic approaches to the problem.
First: Reduce the area of untrammeled administrative discretion by enacting legislative standards that will afford real guidance
to the agencies in effectuating congressionally-approved policies.
Second: Remove the aura of secrecy, which serves as a fertile
breeding ground for improper influences. It can be removed by
requiring the agencies to make public their criteria of decision,
and by providing for public participation in rulemaking proce81 307

U .s. 183, 191 (1939).
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dures, and by providing means whereby such participation would
be effective.
Third: Guarantee fairness of procedure by providing for due
separation of functions within the agencies, and by adopting measures designed to assure that decision shall be based on matters of
record and not on ex parte conferences, and to assure that all the
matters considered in reaching the decision shall be known to all
parties.
Fourth: Achieve a justicialization of the decision-making process. This approach has several facets. It contemplates that the
hearing officers would be made, in effect, trial judges. They would
decide the case at the conclusion of the hearing, and on the basis
of the matters adduced at the hearing. Their decision would stand
as the decision of the agency, subject to appeal on certain basic
issues (such as questions of law) directly to the heads of the agency,
who would be able to consider the appealed cases in the same
manner as appellate judges consider appealed cases, and to write
Garefully reasoned opinions disposing of the key issues thus
presented. For many agencies, this simple remedy would cure
most of the evils of institutional decision. But in others-the
Federal Trade Commission and the National Labor Relations Board
come to mind as two illustrative instances-it would seem helpful
to follow the example afforded by the Tax Court, and to separate
the prosecuting and policy-making functions from the judicial
function, vesting the latter in a separate court.
Conclusion
I have made bold to suggest that administrative agencies have
strayed from the political theories and judicial norms that constitute our American Rule of Law-one of the most precious of our
American heritages. But I do not view the departure as in any
way a planned subversive attempt to overthrow our philosophical
ideals of government. Rather, I think, the departure has been
almost accidental-a result of a lack of careful planning and supervision. When the procedural difficulties I have described have
been corrected, a healthy change of attitude will follow. The
present condition of the patient may be grave, but the prognosis
is favorable.

